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Abstract: This paper examines the treatment of ontology offered by Critical Realism. 
Three main criticisms are made of the Critical Realist treatment of open systems. It is 
argued that Critical Realism, particularly in the project in economics emanating from 
Cambridge, UK, tends to define systems in terms of events. This is shown to be 
problematic. The exemplar of a closed system provided by Critical Realism of the 
solar system is shown to be flawed in that it is not closed according to the closure 
conditions identified by Critical Realism. Second, the negativity of the definitions 
adopted is problematic for heterodox traditions attempting to build positive programs. 
The dualism of the definitions is also inconsistent with Dow’s approach. This has 
ramifications for the coherence of Post Keynesianism. Third, the definitions tend to 
polarize open and closed systems and ignore the degrees of openness evident in 
reality. This polarization of systems leads to polarized methodology and unsustainable 
arguments to reject so-called closed-systems methods. 
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CRITICAL REALISM IN ECONOMICS AND OPEN-SYSTEMS 
ONTOLOGY: A CRITIQUE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been an increasing use of the term “open systems” to describe the complex 
and unpredictable environment faced by economists and economic agents (Setterfield, 
2000; Lawson, passim). “Open Systems” has even been advanced as a potential basis 
for heterodox economics (Hodgson, 1988; Dunn, 2001; see also Downward, 1999), 
and has arguably become a tacit assumption therein. However, Hodgson (2000) and 
Mearman (2002a) have argued that it is somewhat undeveloped and that, therefore, it 
would seem inappropriate for heterodox economics to be based squarely on the 
concept (cf. Dunn; Dow, 2000). Even if “open-systems methodology” remains only 
one of the pillars of heterodoxy (as in Downward, 1999; Lee, 2002) it still requires 
development. This paper deals particularly with the ontology of open systems. 
The paper aims to develop the concept of “open systems” by offering a 
constructive critique of the increasingly influential Critical-Realist view. Critical 
Realism (C.R.) is of course a variegated literature, including the work of Downward 
(1999, 2003), Lee (2002), Finch and McMaster (2002). However, this paper holds 
C.R. in economics is dominated by a “Cambridge school” view developed by Tony 
Lawson (1997; 2003) and others, mainly those (mainly at Cambridge University) 
closely influenced by Lawson.
1 This view has figured prominently in the literature. 
                                                 
1 Other significant members of this category are Clive Lawson (1996), Pratten (1996), Runde (1996), 
Lewis (1996), Ingham (1996), Siakantaris (2000), Faulkner (2002), Fleetwood (2002) and Pinkstone 
(2000). Setterfield (2000) also has this connection, but has arguably moved in a different direction.   2
Arguably, “open systems” is, along with ontological depth, one of the two most 
important concepts in this Cambridge school view.  
This paper argues that there are three problems in this Cambridge school’s 
treatment of open systems: 1) it is dominated by event-level definitions – which also 
reflects an underdeveloped concept of “system;” 2) it emphasizes negative definitions; 
and 3) it tends towards polarizing definitions. This is shown to be problematic in 
many ways: it weakens the ability of C.R. to engage in constructive work, it raises 
questions about the possibility of coherence for Post Keynesianism, and it leads to 
polarized methodological accounts on various issues. The paper proceeds in the order 
of these criticisms. 
 
II. DEFINITIONS OF SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF EVENT REGULARITIES 
 
Definitions 
 
There is a small range of Critical-Realist definitions of closed systems. Closed 
systems are variously defined as being “cut off” from external influences (Collier, 
1994: 128; Bhaskar, 1978: 69); “isolated” (C. Lawson, 1996); where outside factors 
are “neutralise[d]” (Collier: 33); and in which all disturbances are anticipated and 
“held at bay” (1997: 203). The net result is that one mechanism alone operates 
(Collier: 33), unaffected by other mechanisms (Lawson, 1997: 203).
2 The obvious 
example of such a scenario is the experiment. Thus Collier (249-50) and Lawson 
                                                 
2 It would be clarifying to define “mechanism.” Bhaskar (1978:51-2) writes, “a generative mechanism 
is nothing other than a way of acting of a thing. It endures, and under appropriate circumstances is 
exercised, as long as the properties that account for it persist”.    3
(1999a: 216) effectively equate closed-systems methods as experimental (and open-
systems as non-experimental).
3 Strictly, the focus on isolation is incorrect, since 
experimentation imposes requirements inside the isolated area. Archer (1998: 190) 
notes that even in isolated environments, the nature of humans means that the 
“closure” of experimentation cannot be achieved (see Mearman, 2003a). These 
problems are such that Bhaskar (1986: 101) claims that closed systems are 
“impossible” in social science.  
Additional (partial) definitions of a closed system in C.R. are that relations 
within a system are stable (Beed & Beed, 1996: 1099); and that conditions are 
imposed on the individuals in the system (Bhaskar, 1978: 69). A fully closed system 
is where all individual and system criteria for closure are satisfied (Bhaskar, 1978: 
104), which suggests both a regularity of behavior (Bhaskar, 1978: 253, n. 1) and a 
homogeneous – unchanging and uniform – environment (Lawson, 1997: 218); 
consequently, transformative action is impossible in a fully closed system (Bhaskar, 
1986: 31). According to C.R., closure is achieved when specific closure conditions 
hold. The most significant of these are the Intrinsic Condition of Closure (I.C.C.) and 
the Extrinsic Condition of Closure (E.C.C). The I.C.C. requires that the object in 
question has a constancy or constancy of change, such that elements “inside” the 
system are stable enough to be identified. The E.C.C. entails that no outside forces 
impinge on the particular object or system, or that any external effect is constant.  
                                                 
3 Here, “experimental” refers to a situation in which a scientist intervenes to isolate and control a 
specific mechanism. Thought experiments are not included. This is slightly unsatisfactory, because 
thought experiments are also important to science; and because thought experiments might also involve 
the isolation and control of mechanisms, albeit in thought.    4
Many of the Cambridge treatments also emphasize closure conditions. 
However, this paper argues that despite the apparently variety of definitions, the 
Cambridge school definition of open and closed systems has been, and is being 
increasingly, restricted to one. That is, closed (and hence open) systems are defined in 
terms of events and their regularity. 
Consider the following definitions of closed systems: Closed systems can be 
identified when the symmetry thesis (of explanation and prediction) holds (Sayer, 
1992: 130), or where there is a warrant for eduction (inference to particular instances) 
(Bhaskar, 1986: 30). Closure also means that there is a one-to-one relationship 
(isomorphism) between mechanisms and events (Lawson 1994a: 517). This implies 
the main definition of a closed system: a unique relationship between antecedent and 
consequent (Bhaskar, 1978: 53); a stability of empirical relationships (Collier, 1994); 
or a constant conjunction of events. This definition flows from the Humean 
conception that only regular successions between events – not underlying mechanisms 
(should they exist) – can be identified. Thus causality is conceived as merely 
correlation, which in turn calls for the identification of event regularities between 
isolated atomistic states (Rotheim, 1999: 73).   
Lawson identifies closed systems as being where the formula “if event of type 
X occurs, then event of type Y will occur” (where X and Y can be scalars, vectors, or 
matrices – Lawson, 1994a: 507, n. 9). More recently, Lawson has modified this 
further to take into account the common practice of completely specifying the 
conditions under which closure holds. Thus, closed systems conform to the formula, 
“if X, then Y, under conditions E” (Lawson, 1989a: 63; 1995a: 15). Such event 
regularities could be either deterministic or probabilistic (Lawson, 1999b: 273), which 
in the latter case means that events will be in regular succession within some well-  5
behaved probability distribution (Lewis and Runde, 1999: 38; Lawson, 1997: 76).
4 In 
this case, the closure is stochastic (Lawson, 1997: 153-4). Lawson repeats this event-
level definition in his most recent work (Lawson, 2003: 5, 15, 23, 41, 103, 105, 143, 
222, 306).
5 
Other instances of this event-level definition of closed systems in terms of 
constant conjunctions of events have appeared in the literature: Lawson (1996: 407), 
Pratten (1996: 439), C.Lawson (1996: 451, 459), and Lewis (1996: 487). Of course, 
all of those authors descend from Cambridge University. Rotheim (1998: 326, 329-
331) and Lawson (1998: 359, 369) reiterate the definition. Clearly the event-level 
definition is not the only one offered by C.R. However, it is argued that this 
definition, particularly in those (mainly at Cambridge) influenced by Lawson, has 
begun to dominate. This is shown most clearly in the definition of an open system. 
Bhaskar (1978) defines open systems as the lack of “regular” (33) or 
“invariable” (73) succession; no unique relationship between variables (53); or a non-
invariance of empirical relationships (132). For Sayer (1992: 122), openness entails 
short-lived or non-existent regularities. Essentially, an open system is identified as, 
“Not ‘if X then Y’” (Collier, 1994), or as where there are no constant conjunctions of 
events (Bhaskar, 1989: 16). This has been adopted by the recent literature on C.R. in 
economics. Therein, open systems are defined as where there are no event regularities 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, neither Lewis and Runde nor Lawson define clearly what is meant by a well-behaved 
probability distribution. Both seem to define a “well-behaved” distribution as symmetrical with a mean 
of zero, such as the (standard) Normal. This seems to be the way in which Lawson (1989b) interprets 
the E.C.C. in econometrics.  
5 Lawson (2003:15) does develop his concept of closed systems. He distinguishes between closure as 
concomitance and closure as causal sequence. However, the closure is still identified via the event 
level.   6
(Pratten, 1996: 23, Rotheim, 1999; Lawson, 2003: 79, 82, 119, 223-4)
6 or as systems 
lacking sharp (i.e., precise) stable event regularities (Lewis and Runde, 1999: 38).  
 
Critique 
 
It was argued above that the Cambridge school of C.R. in economics mainly defines 
open/closed systems in terms of event regularities. Before showing how this is 
problematic, one other point should be made. Pratten (1996: 426) writes, “In critical 
realist contributions such regularities are referred to as closures.” Further, Pratten 
(431) criticizes neo-Ricardian economics for its use of “givens” as closures, where 
such givens are dependent on regularities. Rotheim (1998: 331) also claims that 
closures are constant conjunctions of events (see also Lawson, 2003: 41). However, 
this can only be correct under that highly specific definition, but not under the other 
Critical-Realist definitions of closed systems above. Under these definitions, it cannot 
be correct to define closed systems as event regularities. For, an event regularity is not 
equivalent to closure; it is suggestive of closure. As evidenced by the ICC and ECC, 
closure occurs beneath the level of events. The action of the mechanisms under 
particular circumstances, perhaps in effective isolation, is the closure, which creates 
the event regularity. The claim conflates the empirical with the real: this is known as 
empirical realism, a flattening of ontology. It also suggests that the epistemic fallacy 
has been committed: what exists is reduced to what is known. It also suggests 
actualism, defined as the denial of the existence of underlying mechanisms and 
                                                 
6 In fact, Lawson (2003) spends little time defining open systems. However, he does also define them 
in terms of the presence of multiple causes or conditions (42, 56, 125, 229, 233) or where reality is 
highly internally related (229).    7
acknowledges only actual events or experiences (Collier, 1994: 7). Empirical realism, 
the epistemic fallacy and actualism are all explicitly denied and rejected by C.R. 
These contradictions arise here because of the event-level definition of closed 
systems. 
However, it might be argued that the classification of systems in terms of 
event regularities merely reflects the Critical-Realist logic of retroduction, which 
begins at the level of events and moves downward (in ontological terms) to the level 
of the real, generative mechanisms. The centerpiece and genesis of C.R. is the 
transcendental deduction of the stratified, open, nature of the world from the 
experimental activity of scientists (Bhaskar, 1978). The actual activity of experiment 
in natural science (and the relative failure of experimentation in social science) shows 
the generality of openness and effectively allows C.R. to presume the presence of 
open systems. This holds unless there is evidence to the contrary, namely event 
regularities, however local or brief. Thus, it might be expected for C.R. to focus on 
the level of events. Moreover, Bhaskar (1979: 138) maintains that C.R. is the only 
philosophy of science that takes constant conjunctions of events as neither necessary 
nor sufficient for explanation in natural and social science. In economics, Lawson and 
others have argued that the discipline is dominated by methods which unjustifiably 
presuppose the existence of event regularities; they have identified the search for 
event regularities as the sine qua non of orthodox economics.
7 Econometrics is the 
best example (Lawson, 1989b, 1997, ch. 7; Pratten, forthcoming). The event-level 
                                                 
7 Viskovatoff (1998) questions Lawson’s characterization, arguing that there are (at least) two 
methodologies in orthodox economics: one, he claims, pays no attention to empirical outcomes. 
Lawson (1998) disagreed. Mearman (2003a, 2003b) argues that the language of some orthodox 
economists, such as Sutton (2000), Morgan (2002) and others, implies a concern for mechanisms.   8
definition has high rhetorical value. Therefore, it is to be expected – and it is 
consistent with the aims of the Critical-Realist project – that the Cambridge group 
emphasizes the event-level definition. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that the existence of event-regularities is key; 
that the use of the term “closed system” is incidental. However, if the use is 
incidental, why does it occur? Lawson (1989b, n. 11) claims that the concept owes 
much to the General Systems Theory (G.S.T.) of von Bertalanffy (1950). However, it 
is clear that G.S.T. and C.R. differ greatly: for example, the former stresses the 
existence of entropy as defining a closed system, while the latter makes virtually no 
reference to entropy. Presumably, then, the influence of G.S.T. is by analogy; but if 
C.R.’s definition of closure is contrary to G.S.T.’s, is the analogy rendered 
inappropriate? Clearly, analogy does not require identity: the analogy would have no 
work to do; however a contradiction would seem problematic. For example, entropy 
(and closed systems) is associated with disorder and presumably a messy event level, 
whereas, for C.R. the closed system is defined in terms of event regularity. This does 
not make C.R. incorrect, but it does raise the issue of the basis on which C.R. claims 
ownership of the term “closed system.”  
Furthermore, neither of these arguments in defense of C.R. (if they stand) 
would justify the apparent ignorance of the level of the real in the definition of the 
open/closed system. Critical-Realist methodology is two-sided. Certainly, in Critical-
Realist practice, phenomena, be they crises, localized event regularities, or rough and 
ready patterns of events (so-called “demi-regularities”), etc., are usually the starting 
point in investigation. From the empirical level, real mechanisms are retroduced. 
However, this is followed by the empirical assessment of these hypothesized 
mechanisms. This entails that the empirical is reconstructed from the real. Thus, some   9
attention must be paid to the real level, to determine how those mechanisms produce 
the empirical. This requires extensive consideration of the workings of the system in 
question; i.e., its real causal mechanisms set in structures; and its structure, 
boundaries, etc., to illuminate exactly how the empirical is generated. Thus, there is a 
need for a more positive definition of the open system, which includes both the real 
level and the event level. This argument is complementary to Brown, Slater and 
Spencer’s (2003) argument that Critical-Realist abstraction is weak in terms of 
reconstituting the concrete. 
Mearman (2002a, b) argues that this problem stems from the use of the term 
“system” in the Cambridge school of C.R, which effectively ignores the two-part 
nature of the term: specifically, an open system is a system that is open. More broadly 
C.R.’s notion of the system is relatively underdeveloped. Indeed, Bhaskar (1978: 73) 
claims that system “carries no independent semantic force.”
8 This seems to prove the 
point. Moreover, there is no clear picture of the term in C.R.
9 At times it refers to 
mechanisms, or the “structures” wherein they reside. In a sense this is accurate, since 
a closed system is one in which only one mechanism (that in question) operates. 
Similarly, an open system is where a mechanism operates but is open and subject to 
other mechanisms. However, this ignores the fact that the mechanism is at the real 
level, but generates events at the empirical level. Both of these levels are part of the 
system, thus, just as the system cannot be reduced to the events, nor can it be reduced 
to the mechanism. Moreover, when Lawson (1999c: 5) writes, “The aim [of 
                                                 
8 Lawson (2003:15-6) also downplays the significance of the term “system,” claiming that the 
definition of the system is merely dependent on the area or time over which an event regularity can be 
found. 
9 Other economists drawing on C.R., such as Downward (1999), Lee (2002), Brown, et al (2003) and 
Mearman (2002b) are trying to address this apparent lacuna.   10
experiment] is to engineer a system in which the actions of any mechanism being 
investigated are more readily identifiable,” he differentiates clearly between a system 
and a mechanism. Lawson (1994b: 279) identifies system and structure separately, 
further weakening the equality. In short, the notion of system seems underdeveloped 
and this makes constructive research and the reconstitution of the real more difficult.
10 
The problem of the event-level definition can be illustrated by reference to the 
claim, common in C.R., that the solar system represents a rare example of a closed 
system found outside experimental control (Bhaskar, 1978: 65; Lawson, 1996: 407, 
411; Runde, 1996: 472-3; Lawson, 1999c: 4; Pratten, 1996: 23). This is because it 
exhibits, or at least approaches, complete event regularity. However, if one of the 
criteria for closure is, as stated above, that the symmetry thesis holds, the solar system 
cannot be a priori a completely closed system, since there is the possibility that an 
unpredictable asteroid could disrupt planetary motion. Runde (474) recognizes this: 
“Of course, even the regular movements of the planets is itself contingent on the 
planetary system remaining undisturbed (and by most accounts, eventually, the 
system will be disturbed). But it is a system that, relative to our own life histories, 
changes so slowly as to be imperceptible.” It is commendable that Runde considers 
                                                 
10 Lawson (1989a:71) does offer a definition of a “system,” in terms of a combination of structures. 
Second, he defines a totality and differentiates between it and a system: arguably in terms of the extent 
of internal relationality between structures. Furthermore, the dialectical turn of CR has produced the 
concept of “totality,” which is a system of internal relations (Bhaskar, 1993:405), with an intensive and 
extensive margin (125). Clearly this captures better the notion of “system,” except that the totality 
seems to be completely internally related, whereas the system includes externally related elements. 
Bhaskar (95-6, 127, 269, 273; 357) distinguishes between open and closed totalities but these are 
distinct from the concept of open (and closed systems) used, which remains: “Systems where constant 
conjunctions of events do not occur” (401).    11
the issue; however, his claim about imperceptible change is inconsistent with C.R. To 
claim that because we perceive the universe as stable, it must be so, reduces existence 
to knowledge and commits the epistemic fallacy. Furthermore, Runde classifies the 
system according to what has happened, rather than what might potentially happen. 
This is somewhat inevitable, because we rely on ex post descriptions; but his is a 
description of the events only and ignores the potentialities within the objects of the 
system. This suggests actualism.  
Moreover, Runde has shown that the solar system is not closed: it is at least 
potentially subject to disturbances. Thus, the E.C.C. does not hold. Yet the E.C.C. is 
held to be necessary for a regularity and hence a closed system. Only by defining the 
system in terms of past events does the E.C.C. hold. Moreover, the I.C.C. does not 
hold either. Specifically, an assumption of the I.C.C. in the solar system would require 
the underlying constancy or constant rate of change of the entire system and indeed 
the universe. However, such an assumption would be bold: Monastersky (2002) 
claims that proponents of the so-called “inflation” and “M” theories of physics agree 
that the rate of expansion is unknown. Furthermore, Collier (1994: 244) admits that 
cosmology studies changing entities – new tendencies emerge as the structure of the 
cosmos changes. For example, he notes, “Big Bang” theories postulate differences 
mechanisms operating immediately after that event. Of course, assuming a constant 
rate of expansion of the universe seems reasonable; however, it entails an assumption 
that is known to be quite possibly at odds with reality. When others do this, C.R. 
accuses them of instrumentalism (Lawson, 1989b). The key point is this: in the solar 
system, neither the E.C.C. nor the I.C.C. seem to be satisfied; these conditions are 
necessary for a closed system; yet C.R. claims that the solar system is a closed system 
because of the regular actual recorded movements of the planets. The claim appears to   12
be actualist, contrary to depth realism. Clearly, the event-level definition of systems is 
limited and limiting.  
Finally, it should be noted that Lawson (1995b: 267) leaves open the 
possibility of local closures, even if by “chance,” i.e., even if there was no prior basis 
to believe that regularity determinism or stochasticism held (see also Lawson, 2003: 
15). This is significant. If closures are defined as “if X, then Y,” by chance, then a 
system can be called closed, without knowing anything about that system, merely its 
outcomes. Moreover, as a general case, it is possible for two external forces, acting on 
the mechanism inside a system, to exactly cancel out each other. If the mechanism 
inside the system were constant, the outcome would be to produce a regularity. Yet 
the system is clearly open (in a broader sense) because of the impact of the external 
mechanisms. Thus, again, “if X then not Y” seems not the best way to define an open 
system. 
 
III. NEGATIVE DEFINITIONS OF OPEN SYSTEMS 
 
Several of the definitions of open systems offered above were of the form “if X, then 
not Y” or variations on that. Here, these are called negative definitions because they 
stress an absence of a condition, specifically of a regularity. A positive definition 
would be classed as one that stresses the presence of some particular. In addition to 
the negative definitions, presented above, open systems have been defined in C.R. as 
where closure conditions fail to hold (Downward, 1999: 17), or that internal and 
external parameters are nonconstant (Sayer, 1981: 138). In partial defense of the 
Cambridge school within C.R., other definitions of openness are similar. Kaldor 
(1972) suggests openness, in his concern that, contra orthodox models, constraints   13
(for instance on consumers) would not be binding (see Hahn, 1989: 55); and also that 
changes in organization, for instance, create possibilities for further change (see Hahn, 
1989: 49). Grunberg (1978: 542) equates openness with a lack of constants (and with 
complexity) and therefore with the inability “to ascertain invariant relationships.” 
Keynes (1973: 262-3) conducts thought experiments on the effect of money wage 
reductions in ‘closed’ and then ‘unclosed’ systems, which are national systems 
affected by foreign economic factors.  
Dow (passim) defines an open system, again, effectively as “not closed,” as 
does Downward (1999). Dow offers essentially the reverse of her definition of the 
closed system. Thus, in an open system, not all constituent variables are known, 
structural relations are not all known or knowable, and traditional logic is not 
applicable (Dow, 1996: 14). Relatedly, Olsen (2000), writing economics informed by 
C.R., seems to define an open system as being incomplete, or not fully specified by 
the theorist. This mirrors Setterfield (2000), but also some orthodox definitions, which 
define a closed system as complete, where all variables are modeled Hendry (1995: 
310).   
In fairness, C.R. does offer “positive” definitions. For example, Collier writes, 
“In open systems…a multiplicity of mechanisms is operating, conjointly bringing 
about a series of events, which would not have been brought about by any proper 
subset of those mechanisms” (1994: 43-4). Thus, outcomes are complexly co-
determined (Collier: 62) by a “plurality and a multiplicity of causes” (Bhaskar, 1978: 
72). Therefore the same mechanism can lead to different outcomes (i.e., rather than “if 
X, then Y,” the result would be “if X, then any one of Y1,…,Yn,”); and an outcome 
can be produced by a number of mechanisms.     14
Interestingly, several authors (Dow, 1996; Setterfield, 2000; Lewis and Runde, 
1999) have argued that openness of a social system can be identified by the existence 
of real choices for individuals (in the sense that the outcome of the choice is not 
predetermined).
11 Bhaskar (1979: 114) defines this as where “the agent’s activity 
makes a difference to the state of affairs that would (normally) otherwise have 
prevailed.” Significantly, also, Lawson (1995b: 265) argues, “social structure is 
human agent-dependent: it is only ever manifest in human activity. Thus, given the 
open nature of human action, the fact that any agent could always have acted 
otherwise, it follows that social structure can only ever be present in an open system.” 
Clearly, social structure would disappear without humans – although, it is not created 
by the specific humans present at that time (Archer, 1995) – but to assume this, it is 
necessary that humans have choice.  
Dow (1996) defines an open system, in addition to the criteria above, as one 
with fuzzy or indeterminate boundaries. This is a departure from the C.R. definition: 
even though the E.C.C. might imply a boundary, it says nothing explicit about it: 
indeed, the notion of the system boundary is essentially absent in C.R. Dow also notes 
that an open system is identifiable by imperfect ordering, i.e., with a degree of 
disorder (Dow: 14). This is opposite to the G.S.T. concept of closed-systems being 
associated with randomness (in the usual sense). Disorder is perhaps only present in 
C.R. in that a non-invariant empirical relationship might imply disorder.  
                                                 
11 This contrasts to orthodox models of the consumer. Given preferences, prices, income, the assumed 
rationality of the consumer, and the assumed goal of utility maximisation, the  rational agent in 
orthodox economics has no real choice: there is only one possible outcome for the consumer; 
moreover, they are assumed to be unable to change any of the variables relevant to their decision 
(DeUriarte, 1989-90).    15
One final definition to consider is Kapp’s (1968), which, in one way, 
corresponds exactly with an aspect of the G.S.T. definition: that an open system is one 
that receives (and survives on) impulses from outside. It is difficult to identify this 
aspect in the Critical-Realist definition since there, a) “system” is not well defined, 
and b) the spatial aspect is de-emphasized (Bhaskar, 1978: 76-7). Another aspect of 
Kapp’s definition is that in open systems there is an interaction between sub-systems. 
This is perhaps akin to the common notion that larger systems (sometimes considered 
open, in other work, closed) do comprise sub-systems. Again, for the same reasons as 
stated immediately above, it is difficult to conceptualize this notion in C.R.   
In spite of the large apparent variety of definitions presented, it is argued that 
in economics, the definitions that dominate the discourse of open systems are 
negative. This is particularly the case with regard to the ‘Cambridge school’ of C.R. in 
economics. To reaffirm this, it should be noted that Lawson (2003), while offering 
definitions of open systems in terms of, for instance, multiple mechanisms (above), he 
also defines open systems in terms of unpredictability (100), unsusceptibility to 
closure (62), lack of event regularities (see above), and the impossibility of 
experiments (84). Moreover, most of the positive, i.e., not simply the opposite of a 
closed system, definitions discussed above are from outside C.R. They also achieve 
more than the negative Critical-Realist definitions above, which remain basically at 
the level of events, by discussing the domain of the real, specifically the nature of the 
structures to be found there.  
It has been argued that the dominant ‘Cambridge view’ definitions of open 
systems are negative. The key issue is whether this is problematic. Arguably it is the 
nature of argument that concepts develop in this way. Clearly, it is common to define 
an unfamiliar object in terms of the familiar. Moreover, in the development of C.R.   16
called Dialectical C.R. (after Bhaskar, 1993), a key concept is that absences can be 
causal and that their existence is significant. However, this paper finds the negative 
definitions to be problematic for two main reasons. First is the issue of the nature of 
heterodoxy. It is the nature – indeed, the literal definition – of heterodoxy that it 
opposes the current orthodoxy. However, the danger for heterodoxy is that its would-
be critics often reduce its definition to being “not orthodoxy” or “not neo-classicism” 
(cf. Walters & Young, 1997; Lawson, 1994a). Clearly, heterodox economics is more 
than this: Marx, Veblen and Keynes (for example) were all involved in criticizing the 
orthodoxy, but they also offered criticisms of contemporary society, and (all perhaps 
except Veblen) offered a constructive alternative program. Nonetheless, the negativist 
perception persists and is damaging to the heterodoxy.
12  
The second problem relates to the substantive consequences of the negative 
definitions. The mode of construction and development of the definition are 
significant. Often a “dualist” process occurs. From Dow (1996: 16-17), dualism is 
“…the propensity to classify concepts, statements and events according to duals, as 
belonging to only one of two all-encompassing, mutually-exclusive categories with 
fixed meanings.” The unfamiliar is defined in terms of the familiar by placing it in 
opposition to it. Often the similarities between the two are ignored. For example, one 
might define irrationality in terms of rationality, missing intermediate concepts. 
Indeed, as Mearman (2003c) argues, a central point of Dow’s (1990, 1996) work is 
that such dualism leads to errors. The argument here is that the standard realist 
definition of openness tends to dualism, i.e., it has an unfamiliar concept, “open 
                                                 
12 One of the principal tasks of heterodox economists and organisations is to develop coherence and/or 
develop arguments against the necessity of coherence. This remains, in spite of the clear fragmentation 
of the orthodoxy (cf. Viskovatoff, 1998; Caldwell, 1982).   17
systems,” and a familiar (via orthodox economic and scientific practice) concept, 
“closed systems.”  
Hence, definitions of open systems tend to begin with definitions of closed 
systems. Mearman (2003c) shows that even when the concepts are poles, i.e., defined 
in terms of each other, as in the case of open and closed systems, the relationship 
between the two terms can be severed and two strictly distinct categories can emerge. 
It is argued below that this sometimes occurs in Critical-Realist argument regarding 
open systems. There are two general and serious consequences for C.R. First, 
Mearman (2003a, c) argues, following Dow, that the conditions for dualism are 
usually not met in open systems. Dualism requires atomism, certainty and closure for 
its mutually exclusive, exhaustive and fixed categories: none of these are usually to be 
found in open systems. Thus, by adopting a dualist definition of open systems, open-
systems proponents are engaged in closed-systems thinking. Of course, dualism is not 
incorrect per se: a door might be open or closed; however, it could also be ‘ajar’. 
Crucially, though, it is held that very often dualistic categories are either incorrect or 
eliminate useful possible categories. Second, therefore, there is a conflict between 
Dow’s position and C.R. This has implications for the goal of coherence for Post 
Keynesianism (cf. Mearman, 2001a; Downward, 1999; Dow, 1999). This reinforces 
the problem of negativity identified above. Thus, for these two reasons, more positive 
definitions of open systems are needed. From section II, these positive definitions 
should not be restricted to the event level. 
 
IV. POLARITY OF OPEN/CLOSED 
   18
The argument of section III implies a conflict between Dow’s position and C.R. on 
the question of a dualist categorization of open and closed systems. However, this is 
only strictly the case if the categorization is invalid in reality: some dualistic 
categories might in fact be correct; however, for Dow, this is either unlikely, and/or 
there are not epistemological grounds for arriving at those certain categories. So, the 
immediate question is whether open/closed systems should be treated as strictly 
separate. For, often in C.R., it seems as if a system is not completely closed, then it is 
inescapably open, rendering closed-systems methods totally impotent. For example, 
Lawson (1999d) insists that econometrics is only valid in strictly closed systems. 
Thus, there is a need to investigate two points on two different levels. It needs to be 
established whether C.R. is unjustifiably dualist in its treatment of the distinction of 
open-systems/closed-systems (1) ontologically and (2) methodologically. If this is so 
on either count, this is problematic, for the reasons given earlier. If the treatment is 
dualist on one count but not on the other, then this is a disjuncture between the two, 
which seems problematic for a realist perspective. 
 
Ontology 
 
Open/closed systems might appear to be a clear dual, given that the two concepts are 
defined most often simply as opposites of each other. This can be investigated further 
by examining the polar extremes, perfect openness and perfect closure. Recently, the 
polar view has been suggested, by for example, Rotheim (1999: 75). Lawson (1994b: 
276) suggests “two extremes – strict event regularities or a completely non-systematic 
flux – merely constitut[ing] the polar extremes of a potential continuum.” Later (277) 
he proposes “a continuum of outcomes…ranging from closed systems of constant   19
conjunctions of events to an inchoate random flux.” Consistent with section II, the 
definition is in terms of events. Arguably, it is unlikely that either extreme actually 
exists in reality. First, Collier (1994: 33) claims, “no system in our universe is ever 
perfectly closed.” Above, it was shown that even the solar system is not closed. 
Therefore, the prime example of naturally occurring closure given by C.R. is invalid. 
Lawson (1997: 203) demurs somewhat, claiming, “the goal of perfect closure … 
cannot always adequately be engineered; indeed it may very rarely be.”  
At the other end of the spectrum, Critical-Realist authors have clarified that 
openness refers neither to a complete arbitrariness of events Rotheim (1999: 75) nor 
to an inchoate flux (see Lawson, 1994b: 276). Indeed, Cottrell (1998) criticizes C.R., 
in that significant regularities are in fact found in the social world. An example might 
be that one works and then gets paid. Lawson (1998) replies that, indeed, people go to 
work and are paid after working; but they can go home and perform the same activity 
for no pay. Therefore, the strict regularity “if work, then get paid” fails to hold.
13 This 
is not to deny that much of the time “if work, then get paid” does hold, just not always 
and everywhere. Other reasons might be that people work voluntarily, or that some 
crisis occurs which prevents payment (Argentinean public service workers and Iraqi 
soldiers are recent examples). In reality, this is the openness that Lawson (et al) 
discusses, not inchoate flux. Again, all these arguments are presented in terms of 
event regularities, supporting the argument of section II.  
Practically, there is no prospect that either perfect openness or perfect closure 
exists. Between the two theoretical extremes lies everything of practical interest. 
                                                 
13 Clearly this assumes a broader definition of work than, for example, “leave the home to work on 
another’s property.” This is contentious but consistent with the Critical-Realist treatment of “work” 
(Bhaskar, 1978:194-5).   20
Nevertheless, the language of C.R. focuses on the extreme cases. C.R. accuses 
orthodoxy of clinging to methods based on the perfect (non-existent) closed system. 
However, C.R. also uses the perfect (but unachievable) closed system in order to 
construct its alternative. The contrast between on the one hand astronomy, and on the 
other, every other discipline, serves a rhetorical purpose and has rhetorical value. 
Rather than envisaging the spectrum of open-closed systems as a continuum, bounded 
by theoretical if not practically attainable extremes, C.R. treatments tend to begin with 
the notion of a (perfectly) closed system and look for instances whereby the event 
regularity fails to hold. Where this is the case, the system is classified “open.” 
However, there is clearly a difference between a system in which there exists a 
mechanism that occasionally operates, whereas the system is otherwise stable; and 
one in which there is a chaotic mess of sporadically active mechanisms, continually 
combining in novel ways. In the former case, there remains a good chance of 
developing knowledge, whereas in the latter, that chance seems remote. However, 
both would be called “open” and both would fail to exhibit event regularity. Again, 
the discussion is in terms of events (section II) and negativity (section III). 
In fairness, at other times, Critical-Realist treatments have acknowledged the 
existence of such “partial closure.” Partial closure can have a variety of meanings. 
Sayer (1992: 124) defines quasi-closed systems as “producing regularities that are 
only approximate and spatially and temporally restricted.” The definition suggests two 
types of partial closure. One is defined in terms of spatial or temporal specificity. This 
definition suggests a large, open mass segmented into smaller closed systems. This is 
close to the Critical-Realist notion of “local closures.” This is a sense in which C.R. 
often speaks about partial closure. Bhaskar (1978: 78) argues, “for experimental 
science to be possible the world must be open but susceptible to regional closures.”   21
Similarly, “A closure is of course always relative to a particular set of events and a 
particular region of space and period of time” (Bhaskar: 73). This corresponds with 
Sayer (1992) above. This notion of historically and spatially specific closures is 
consistent in C.R., from Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1978; 1979: 128; 1986: 27) and developed 
by, for example, Lawson in two of his most important contributions. First, with regard 
to econometrics Lawson says it is legitimate to investigate whether, “in certain 
conditions some closed-systems methods or whatever could contribute to 
enlightenment” (Lawson, 1999d: 8) (emphasis added). The conditions in question 
suggest local closures. 
Lawson’s second contribution of import, the identification of the usefulness of 
rough and ready patterns, called demi-regularities, relies on the premise that local 
closures are possible (see Lawson, 1997: Ch. 15). As Lawson (219) notes, demi-
regularities are “a special situation of the open world [in which] certain mechanisms 
(whether natural or social) reveal themselves in rough and ready patterns…[but] it is a 
special case of this special situation that the patterns produced correspond to strict 
event regularities…” (emphasis in original).
14 Clearly demi-regularities are the result 
of a form of partial closure. Indeed, they possess two senses of partial closure. The 
latter case seems to suggest a complete closure in a specific space-time position as 
discussed above, whilst the former suggests an incomplete closure. Therefore, the 
concept of demi-regularity suggests a meaning of closure as meaning “closed to an 
extent.” For example, Bhaskar, (1989: 185) claims that biology deals with quasi-
                                                 
14 Lawson (2003:105-6) clarifies his concept of demi-regularity. It can apply to any rough and ready 
pattern, even when the pattern involves a deviation from an expected regularity.   22
closed systems.
15 An example given is the study of the life cycle of an organism; 
however, the reasoning is not explicit. This definition of partial closure suggests, 
therefore, that partially-closed systems are ones in which the event regularity is 
apparent yet not strict. Such a partially-closed system might have merely evolved; or 
the system has had closure introduced, making it more closed than before. One such 
source of greater closure might be an institutional feature, such as a rule, habit, 
custom, or convention. Indeed, Sayer (1992: 124) writes, “Many forms of social 
organization tend to approximate regularities in patterns of events by enforcing 
rules…” This captures the concept of partial closure in the first sense very well. 
Lawson (1993: 175) suggests this sense when claiming that when people fall back on 
conventions, this creates “a significant degree of structural stability” even under 
uncertainty. Again, it should be noted that these claims can only be made by going 
beneath the level of events.  
What should be clear immediately is that this nuanced approach does not 
justify any simple strict dualistic treatment of the ontology of open systems. It would 
seem that any Critical-Realist treatments which hold that once perfect closure is 
impossible, distinctions between the different open systems available is lost, would 
seem to be invalid. Moreover, it would seem that Lawson in particular has understood 
this. This is particularly in the light of his emphasis given to the concept of demi-
regularities. Demi-regularities, it is clear, lie somewhere in between the closed system 
of the experiment and the chaos of a perfectly open system. Thus, there is a role for a 
concept of partial closure. It is also clear that it is useful to think of systems as lying at 
                                                 
15 Bhaskar (1978:253, n. 1) makes the same point: “…it is clear that some systems, such as biological 
ones, are more nearly closed (reveal a greater degree of regularity of behaviour, or recurrence of 
syndromes) than others…” Again the definition is in terms of event regularities.     23
some point on a continuum. This suggests, in turn, that there are degrees of openness 
of systems. Thus, once we move from the perfection of the experimental closure, 
there are a vast number of slightly different points at which we can stop. Moreover, if 
the perfect closure is viewed as impossible, then the difference between possible 
closures and demi-regularities seems to be much smaller. Thus, Cottrell’s (1998: 352) 
argument that Lawson overstates his contrast between orthodox event regularities and 
his own demi-regularities does seem to be valid: there appears to be a difference in 
degree rather than in kind between them. 
 
Methodology 
 
The most powerful contribution of the Critical-Realist project in economics has been 
to demonstrate the importance of ontology and to reorient economics such that the 
clear disjuncture which exists between reality and the methods employed to 
investigate it should be at least reduced. Thus, methodologies that presuppose strict 
closure should not be relied upon to understand extremely open environments. This 
seems reasonable. However, it is argued that the Cambridge school of C.R. in 
economics has tended to adopt a strategy of rejection of “closed-systems” methods. 
There are several arguments against this (see Mearman, 2003a) but one in particular is 
implied by the above argument. If systems are open to differing degrees, then it is 
likely that methods are too; and therefore the key is to fit methods to situations. 
Moreover, just as it unjustified to conflate systems that are not completely closed into 
a single category of “open-systems,” it is unjustified to conflate methods that 
presuppose some degree of closure into a category of “closed-systems methods” and 
to reject these. The components of this argument will now be examined.    24
The first component is that the Cambridge view entails a strategy of rejection. 
Two examples are employed to make this case. Pratten (1996) provides one. He 
argues that ultimately, neo-Ricardian economists are faced with the choice of 
abandoning many of their methods or face being rejected by Post Keynesians (439). 
His argument is that although they wish to do realist, open-systems work, neo-
Ricardians are trapped into thinking in terms of closure (435, 437). These conclusions 
are based on his argument that neo-Ricardians engage in closure as a “first step” in 
analysis (431-2). This follows from such features of neo-Ricardian analysis as the use 
of “given” values of certain factors. Pratten is correct to argue that there are certain 
assumptions in the neo-Ricardian analysis that are questionable from the perspective 
of open systems. The assumption of a pre-determined long period would be one 
example. 
Lawson’s (1997) treatment of econometrics provides the other example of 
rejection. Lawson argues that regression analysis is based on the unwarranted 
assumptions of underlying homogeneity and of being able to exclude factors not 
selected for the analysis. His claim is valid. This leads Lawson to argue that a) 
econometrics should be restricted to conditions under which there is complete closure; 
b) econometrics should be redefined in terms of descriptive statistics; and c) other 
methods should be employed which are not guilty of closure. One such example is his 
notion of “contrast explanation” (see Lawson 1997, 2003). 
The objections to both arguments are the same. In both cases, it seems to be 
argued that because the techniques and theories in question seem to involve some 
closure, but the reality is open, the techniques are automatically invalid. This is 
problematic for several reasons. First, these arguments are effectively collapsing 
together techniques and effectively ignoring differences between them. Neo-Ricardian   25
analysis does indeed involve some imposed closure; however, this is significantly less 
than in neo-classical analysis. This ignores the greater realism in neo-Ricardian 
analysis. Moreover, Trigg (2003) argues that in neo-Ricardian analysis, methods are 
employed so as to suit circumstances and that this is evidence of an awareness of 
openness. One charge against Pratten here is that he ignores the way in which the 
closures, such as they are, have been introduced. In short he ignores what Mearman 
(2002a) has termed “process openness,” under which the model or technique should 
not be judged merely on its form but on the method of its creation.  
With respect to Lawson, clearly, there are many different types of 
econometrics, yet they are conflated and rejected except in highly specific 
circumstances. However, as Downward, Finch and Ramsey (2002), Downward and 
Mearman (2002) and Mearman (2003a) –responses derived from C.R. but reacting 
against the strategy of rejection entailed by the Cambridge view – have argued, there 
are elements of closure in all methods, including contrast explanation, such as the 
introduction of closure (I.C.C.) necessary to envisage an entity as relatively enduring 
(Downward, 1999), or the assumption of qualitative invariance involved in 
quantification. Furthermore, to analyze open systems, strategies must be developed, 
which inevitably amount to partially closing, in either sense, in thought, an open 
system. Dow (1996: 14) claims “an open system can be segmented into sub-systems 
which can be approximated to closed systems for partial analysis, but which are 
always open organically to influences from other parts of the overall system.” 
Setterfield (2000) adopts the same tack, citing Kregel’s (1976) stratagem of “locking 
up elements without ignoring them.” Setterfield describes this as a “conditional 
closure.” An obvious example of these techniques is that a Critical-Realist abstraction 
necessarily involves a focus on what is real and essential (Lawson, 1989a) to the   26
temporary exclusion of other factors, regarded as transient or insignificant. However, 
these influences cannot be legitimately completely excluded, as they might interfere at 
any point with the operation of the real and essential (Mearman, 2001b).  
This shows that although there might well be greater openness in some 
techniques, they are not free from closure. Thus, Lawson cannot claim to have open-
systems techniques and Pratten cannot claim to avoid any first steps of closure in 
substantive analysis. Moreover, given that there are degrees of openness of reality, 
there are circumstances under which some more “open” techniques are less suitable 
than more “closed” variants. By treating all types of econometrics as the same, this 
ignores the fact that non- or semi-parametric techniques, for example, involve less 
closure than parametric techniques (Finch and McMaster, 2002). Thus, as Mearman 
(2003a) argues, a strategy of a priori rejection on the basis of openness is 
unsustainable. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has examined the influential treatment of “open systems” by Critical 
Realism, which has been prominent in recent economic literature. This paper has 
argued that a Cambridge view of C.R. in economics is identifiable and distinctive. It is 
argued that this Cambridge view has three problems in its treatment of open systems: 
1) it is dominated by event-level definitions – which also reflects an underdeveloped 
concept of “system;” 2) it emphasizes negative definitions; and 3) it tends towards 
polarizing definitions. These problems create difficulties in trying to develop 
methodology and substantive work informed by Critical Realism. The event-level 
definition is certainly effective for criticizing orthodox economics and for focusing   27
discussion onto ontology. The event-level definition might also act as a rough guide 
for identifying possible closed systems. However, it hinders analysis by ignoring the 
nature of the system. It is also shown to be an imperfect guide to openness. Possibly 
the greatest problem with the Critical-Realist treatment is its polarizing treatments of 
existing methods. This mode of argumentation is clearly intended to criticize the 
orthodoxy. However, it has been shown a number of times that this argument is 
unsustainable. What is needed for the project informed by Critical Realism is the 
construction of a positive, nuanced treatment of systems. This will also involve a 
more complete definition of system, which moves beyond simply classifying systems 
by their event patterns. Such a definition will likely incorporate treatments of systems 
from other literature (Mearman, 2002a, b).  
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